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Abstract 
The article defines the role of the tax system, which it plays to gain competitive advantages of the country in 
social and economic spheres. The system of relevant taxes, characterizing the level of competition of the 
national tax system, is identified. Methodological basis for determining tax countries competing with Ukraine 
based on the cluster analysis is improved. By implementing the algorithm for establishment the European 
countries – tax competitors of Ukraine, firstly, potential tax competitors of Ukraine were identified, secondly, 
real tax competitors of Ukraine in a cluster with a similar structure of the tax system in terms of socio-
economic development were set. 
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Introduction 
At the present stage of the international integration of economic relations the tax systems of countries are 
developing not only under the influence of internal goals of state policy, but also taking into account the global 
trends. That is why the stage of developing a strategy for reforming the country’s national tax system in the 
context of increasing its tax competitiveness should be preceded by the allocation of a range of countries – 
potential tax competitors. This allows identifying similar and distinctive features of the functioning of tax 
systems to determine the competitive advantages and threats that provide a certain level of tax competition. Given 
the existence of tax and non-tax effects of tax competition, it is advisable to group the countries – tax competitors 
considering the specifics of their tax systems, as well as the macroeconomic conditions for their development. 
Literature review  
The theory of tax competition begins to grow actively in the second half of the XXth century. It was the 
beginning of the study of the regional tax competition, conducted by Charles Tiebout [10], who concluded its 
positive role. The next stage was the development of the theory of international tax competition. The study of 
the taxation of foreign capital was conducted in the 1960s by G. McDougall [7],  
P. Richman [8], M. Kemp [6], led to the conclusion that the effectiveness of the tax system of the state in the 
case of taxation of non-resident capital for the location of the investor as opposed to collecting taxes based on 
the source of income. The formalization of the theory of regional tax competition performed by J. Zodrov and 
P. Mietskovski [12] made it possible to demonstrate the effect of capital mobility on the level of tax rates 
established on income from capital. Further development of tax competition envisaged consideration in the 
capacity of mobile factors, not only capital, but also labor power, which is observed in the works of D. Wilson 
and R. Gordon [5], D. Wildasin [11], G. Fernandez [4]. 
The results of the research of tax impact on the mobility of taxpayers, conducted by H. Blöchliger and J. 
Pinero-Campos [1], allowed to define the role of individual taxes in determining the tax competitiveness of 
jurisdiction. The conclusions drawn from the results of calculations made by F. Delgado [3] allowed to argue 
that the European Union countries are characterized by the convergence of the level and structure of tax 
revenues, which necessitates further studies of national tax systems from the point of view of identifying 
countries, most likely to compete for the movement of mobile factors of production due to the similarity of 
conditions of taxation. 
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Results 
Identification of Ukraine’s potential tax competitors, between which the mobile objects of taxation are 
distributed, is expedient to implement on the basis of methods of cluster analysis, which is proposed to be 
carried out in two stages. 
The first stage is the grouping of countries according to the structure of the tax system. At this stage, a sample 
from 38 European countries that have the closest foreign economic ties, and also are geographically close 
enough, which corresponds to the general vector of economic and political integration of Ukraine with the 
countries of the European Union was formed. The input indicators, based on the assessment of the values of 
which the clusterization is conducted, are five criteria that illustrate the structure of the tax system and the 
level of tax burden on various types of taxation objects (Table 1). 
Table 1. Characteristics of cluster parameters of the region 
Criterion Characteristics 
Value Added Tax (VAT) 
The total rate of value added tax, which is subject to the taxation of most goods and 
services 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 
The general corporate income tax rate (in most countries only the income tax rate is 
taken into account) 
Minimum Tax on Personal Income 
(TPImin) 
The minimum tax rate on personal income, different from zero, used in the country 
Maximum Tax on Personal Income 
(TPImax) 
The maximum tax rate on personal income, which is used in the country on income 
above a certain level 
Social Insurance (SI) 
The total rate of social security payments paid by employers and employees, expressed 
as a percentage of gross salary 
The period of the study was 2013, which is due, firstly, to the availability of full statistical reporting for all 
countries that form the initial sample, and secondly, the presence of structural deformations in the socio-
economic development of Ukraine from the beginning of 2014, which are not of an economic but of a political 
nature and military actions. Statistical information in the context of these indicators for the countries studied 
in the period under review is presented in Table 2. The source of statistical information is the statistical 
database “Collecting taxes” USAID [2]. 
Table 2. Indicators characterizing the structure of the tax system in Europe as of 2013 
Country VAT CIT TPImin TPImax SI 
Armenia 20.00 20.00 10.00 20.00 3.00 
Austria 20.00 25.00 20.44 50.00 42.35 
Azerbaijan 18.00 20.00 14.00 30.00 25.00 
Belarus 20.00 24.00 12.00 12.00 12.30 
Belgium 21.00 33.99 25.00 50.00 37.84 
Bulgaria 20.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 28.90 
Croatia 23.00 20.00 12.00 40.00 36.70 
Cyprus 15.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 13.60 
The Czech Republic 20.00 19.00 15.00 15.00 45.00 
Denmark 25.00 25.00 3.67 51.50 2.00 
Estonia 20.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 35.90 
Finland 23.00 26.00 8.50 30.00 27.48 
France 19.60 33.33 5.50 40.00 42.48 
Georgia 18.00 15.00 20.00 20.00 25.00 
Germany 19.00 15.00 15.00 45.00 38.86 
Greece 19.00 24.00 15.00 40.00 33.65 
Hungary 25.00 19.00 17.00 32.00 44.00 
Ireland 21.00 12.50 20.00 41.00 12.50 
Italy 20.00 27.50 23.00 43.00 39.36 
Latvia 21.00 15.00 26.00 26.00 33.09 
Lithuania 21.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 39.98 
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Table 2. Indicators characterizing the structure of the tax system in Europe as of 2013 
Country VAT CIT TPImin TPImax SI 
Luxemburg 15.00 21.00 8.20 38.95 23.75 
Malta 18.00 35.00 15.00 35.00 20.00 
Moldova 20.00 0.00 7.00 18.00 29.00 
The Netherlands 19.00 25.50 1.95 52.00 40.00 
Norway 25.00 28.00 9.00 12.00 21.90 
Poland 22.00 19.00 18.00 32.00 40.32 
Portugal 21.00 25.00 11.08 45.88 34.75 
Romania 19.00 16.00 16.00 16.00 44.00 
Serbia 18.00 10.00 12.00 12.00 35.80 
Slovakia 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 37.60 
Slovenia 20.00 20.00 16.00 41.00 38.20 
Spain 18.00 30.00 24.00 43.00 37.33 
Sweden 25.00 26.30 31.00 57.77 30.43 
Switzerland 8.00 8.50 0.77 11.50 26.20 
Ukraine 20.00 19.00 15.00 17.00 39.15 
The United Kingdom 17.50 28.00 20.00 50.00 23.80 
Turkey 18.00 20.00 15.00 35.00 17.00 
To group the countries, two methods have been used that allow for hierarchical and non-hierarchical clustering 
to obtain the most qualitative distribution. Non-hierarchical clustering was carried out by the k-means method, 
the characteristic feature of which is the need to specify the number of clusters by which the grouping is 
performed (as a rule, the number of clusters is set on the basis of previously formulated hypotheses). The 
evaluation was carried out using the software Statistica 6.0. Given the significant number of countries that 
were included in the sample, it was advisable to test a different number of cluster centers in order to maximize 
the objectivity of the distribution results, since the formulation of hypotheses in this case could lead to artificial 
distortion of results. Therefore, to determine the most qualitative clustering, we estimate the results of the 
variance analysis for a different number of clusters (Table 3). 
Table 3. Results of variance analysis for different clustering options in European countries on the structure 
of tax systems 
Criteria of variance analysis 
Variables 
VAT CIT TPImin TPImax SI 
2 clusters 
Intergroup variance 22.329 721.635 13.756 5759.471 90.059 
Intra-group variance 331.941 1399.068 1729.271 1642.259 4473.183 
Abnormality of factorial sign p 0.134 0.000 0.601 0.000 0.407 
3 clusters 
Intergroup variance 14.622 706.378 132.231 5406.038 2870.521 
Intra-group variance 339.648 1414.325 1610.797 1995.692 1692.722 
Abnormality of factorial sign p 0.488 0.001 0.262 0.000 0.000 
4 clusters 
Intergroup variance 35.775 875.024 163.046 6072.349 3050.806 
Intra-group variance 318.495 1245.679 1579.981 1329.381 1512.437 
Abnormality of factorial sign p 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 
5 clusters 
Intergroup variance 41.201 918.357 579.479 6081.580 3085.786 
Intra-group variance 313.070 1202.345 1163.548 1320.150 1477.456 
Abnormality of factorial sign p 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Note that improving the quality of the cluster distribution illustrates the increase in the values of the intergroup 
variance and the decrease in the values of the intra-group variance, while the abnormality level of the factor 
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sign should not exceed 0.05 units achieved when countries are divided into 4 clusters, 5 clusters make it 
possible to achieve further improvements in the values of intra-group and intergroup variance, however, leads 
to a complication in the interpretation of the characteristics of the clusters obtained, since the coordinates of 
the cluster centers differ little from each other. 
To further verify the adequacy of the results, we also perform hierarchical clustering by the Ward method 
using the Stata 12.0 software. The results of clustering are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The results of clustering of European countries in the structure of tax systems by the Ward method 
The mathematical toolkit of the Stata 12.0 software used in applying this clustering method also allows iden-
tifying the optimal number of clusters at which the most qualitative hierarchical structure of the grouping of re-
search objects is achieved. The estimation of optimal number of clusters in this approach can be performed based 
on the Kalinsky-Kharabash index, which is calculated for each cluster solution – in this case for each level of the 
hierarchy. The maximum value of the index illustrates the clearest clustering (Table 4). 
Table 4. Results of verification of clustering quality by the Kalinski-Kharabash index 
Number of clusters  Kalinski-Kharabash index 
2 19.29 
3 21.94 
4 17.85 
5 17.59 
6 17.52 
7 17.57 
8 18.22 
9 17.70 
10 18.47 
Analyzing the results, we note that the most qualitative distribution is characteristic for the formation of three 
clusters. Given the hierarchical links shown in Figure 1, the distribution of countries by clusters can be carried 
out as follows (Table 5). 
Table 5. Cluster distribution of European countries by the structure of the tax system as a result of applying 
the Ward method 
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Comparison of clustering results obtained by different methods shows that the list of countries included in 
clusters 2 and 3 according to the Ward method, identical to the sets of countries, forming clusters 2 and 3, 
allocation by the k-means method, while cluster 1 is constructed by the method Ward, unites countries 
belonging to clusters 1 and 4, formed by the k-means method. Taking into account received results, the final 
distribution of European countries in the structure of the tax system allowed to form three clusters of tax 
competitors: 
Cluster 1 “Potential competitors for labor” – countries with a moderate level of taxation in proportion to 
existing structure of the tax system, the moderate progressiveness of the system of taxation of personal 
incomes and low level of social contributions. 
Cluster 2 “Potential competitors for the choice of the place of residence” – a country in which there is a 
significant level of tax, high progressive system of taxation of income of individuals, a significant shift of the 
tax burden on individuals. 
Cluster 3 “Potential competitors for capital” – a country characterized by low taxation, insignificant progressive 
system of taxation of income of individuals, however, with a significant level of social contributions. 
The observed clusters of countries are characterized by specific features, not only in terms of the structural 
construction of the tax system, but also by the participation in tax competition. Thus, the countries of the first 
and third clusters of tax competition are mainly short-term in terms of the placement of the objects of taxation. 
The aim of the taxpayers in the choice of jurisdiction in these clusters is to obtain additional income by reduc-
ing the amounts of taxes paid. Consequently, the generation of additional income, which can be disposed of 
by individuals for personal use (cluster 1) or to achieve short-term competitive advantages by saving costs of 
business (cluster 3). At the same time, cluster 2 includes countries that are characterized by a significantly 
higher level of development and, therefore, the welfare of their citizens and better business conditions. This 
indicates significantly different level of tax competition – taxpayers make decisions, given the level of public 
goods (for individuals) or the level of infrastructure support business (for legal entities), which they receive 
because of the payment of a larger tax amount. 
Thus, as a result of the first stage of clustering, it was found that the tax system of Ukraine is characterized by 
the presence of common features with the tax systems of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Switzerland. These countries have the lowest 
level of taxation for the most groups of taxes among the entire sample of the countries studied, namely for 
taxes paid by corporations. This creates grounds for asserting that capital is the main object of tax competition 
in this cluster. The group of these countries is the object of further research in the process of identifying 
countries – real tax competitors in Ukraine. 
The second stage of clustering is the definition of real tax competitors in clusters with a similar structure of 
tax systems in terms of the level of socio-economic development. The goal of this stage is the differentiation 
of countries – potential tax competitors by the proximity degree of their socio-economic development. At this 
stage of the study the following criteria were selected by factorial signs: the level of gross domestic product, 
mln. USD; Consumer price index (price level in 2010 = 100); Annual growth rate of GDP, %; Net national 
income per capita at purchasing power parity, mln. USD. 
These indicators allow considering the overall level of development of the country, which, of course, is im-
portant in the process of decision-making by taxpayers on the placement of taxable items, especially in the 
case of a choice between jurisdictions with similar taxation conditions. The statistical information source for 
the calculations is the World Bank statistical database [9]; the data are presented in Table 6. 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Armenia, Belarus, Norway, 
Turkey, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Turkey, Luxembourg, 
Malta 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Switzerland, 
Ukraine 
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Table 6. Indicators characterizing the level of socio-economic development in Europe as of 2013  
Country 
The level of GDP, 
mln. USD 
The annual 
rate of GDP 
growth,% 
Consumer price index 
(2010 year = 100) 
Net national income per capita at 
purchasing power parity, mln. USD 
Armenia 10431.22 3.50 116.80 8180.00 
Austria 428321.94 0.23 107.95 45040.00 
Azerbaijan 73560.48 5.80 111.54 16180.00 
Belarus 73097.62 1.07 288.65 17000.00 
Belgium 524778.84 0.29 107.66 41160.00 
Bulgaria 54479.87 1.10 108.30 4595.50 
Croatia 57868.67 -0.94 108.08 20890.00 
Cyprus 24057.25 -5.36 105.33 30240.00 
The Czech Republic 208796.02 -0.71 106.80 13648.70 
Denmark 335877.55 -0.49 106.06 45350.00 
Estonia 24880.26 1.62 112.20 11750.10 
Finland 268196.96 -1.32 107.89 40000.00 
France 2810249.22 0.66 105.01 38200.00 
Georgia 16140.05 3.31 107.02 2119.10 
Germany 3730260.57 0.11 105.69 45020.00 
Greece 242230.73 -3.90 103.92 25660.00 
Hungary 133423.90 1.53 111.79 22660.00 
Ireland 232077.37 0.17 104.84 38860.00 
Italy 2136948.26 -1.70 107.16 35000.00 
Latvia 30908.76 4.23 106.71 9603.30 
Lithuania 46403.19 3.31 108.52 10306.90 
Luxembourg 60130.85 1.99 108.01 57830.00 
Malta 9642.85 2.90 106.65 27020.00 
Moldova 7985.35 9.41 117.82 1258.60 
The Netherlands 853539.35 -0.73 107.47 46260.00 
Norway 522349.11 0.74 104.19 66520.00 
Poland 526064.04 1.71 109.08 23160.00 
Portugal 224912.48 -1.60 106.82 27240.00 
Romania 189639.11 3.54 113.70 5864.70 
Serbia 45519.65 2.63 128.51 4122.00 
Slovakia 97712.68 1.42 109.23 15092.20 
Slovenia 47989.86 -1.00 106.29 28650.00 
Spain 1393040.18 -1.23 107.21 32860.00 
Sweden 579526.01 1.28 103.83 46260.00 
Switzerland 685434.21 1.93 99.31 59710.10 
Ukraine 183310.15 0.01 108.33 2059.50 
The United Kingdom 2678173.49 1.66 110.18 37900.00 
Turkey 823242.59 4.20 124.6 7862.00 
At this stage, the Ward’s hierarchical clustering method was applied, according to which, firstly, clusters are 
formed, which include one country, allows to identify the proximity degree of factor characteristics in the 
context of individual countries. Given the different dimensions of the criteria being evaluated, the 
standardization of data was carried out before the hierarchical analysis, which allowed them to be distributed 
in the range (-3; 3). 
Based on the calculations, we can draw the following conclusions regarding the choice of countries whose tax 
policy should be taken into account when establishing a strategy for the development of Ukrainian tax 
competitiveness: 
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➢ considering a similar level of socio-economic development, Bulgaria is the most real tax competitor of 
Ukraine. At the same time, it should be noted that Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia and Slovakia, as well as 
Moldova and Serbia compete within this cluster to the greatest extent; 
➢ similar level of socio-economic development in comparison with Ukraine and Bulgaria is demonstrated 
by Georgia, which allows attributing it to the type of possible tax competitors in Ukraine. At the same 
time, among the countries being evaluated, it should be noted that Romania has similar features with 
Latvia and Lithuania in terms of socio-economic development indicators, and the Czech Republic can 
compete with Estonia and Slovakia for the placement of funds; 
➢ considering the third level of association that indicates the substantial differences of socio-economic 
development, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania are potential tax competitors of Ukraine; 
➢ despite very significant differences in socio-economic development, the Czech Republic, Estonia and 
Slovakia can be considered as promising tax competitors of Ukraine, the tax competition with which will 
become real in conditions of achieving favorable trends in socio-economic development of domestic 
economy; 
➢ dislocated tax competitors of Ukraine and other specified countries are Serbia and Moldova, for which it 
is possible to ascertain the various stages of socio-economic development, which has a significant impact 
on the decisions of taxpayers; 
➢ the latent tax competitor of Ukraine is Switzerland, for which a fundamentally different level of 
socioeconomic development is characteristic in comparison with the economies of other countries that 
have fallen into this cluster.  
Taking into account the obtained results, we consider it expedient to further exclude Switzerland from being 
part of Ukraine’s real tax competitors, since the similarity of the tax system in this case does not matter when 
the taxpayers make decisions, given the fact that Switzerland in most studies is classified as offshore zone 
considering the specifics of the functioning of its banking system. 
So, on the whole, a methodical approach to the definition of Ukraine’s tax competitors in the European tax 
space has been developed and the results of its practical application can be presented in Figure 2 (see in 
Appendix). 
Subsequent to the results of evaluation it has been established that a group of real tax competitors of Ukraine among 
the European countries consists of 10 countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, Moldova and Serbia), which forms the basis for further research to assess the direction 
of trends in the development of these countries, tax systems in the context of identifying the problems and prospects 
of the functioning of the domestic tax system in terms of its tax competitiveness and the development of proposals 
for reform based on the vector of development of the tax systems of its main tax competitors. 
Conclusions 
In the context of reforming the tax system of Ukraine in terms of tax competition, the definition of a clear 
circle of countries – its tax competitors – is of particular importance. For this purpose, a cluster analysis 
of 38 European countries on the criteria of the structure of the country’s tax system and the level of its 
social and economic development was carried out. The most real tax competitor for Ukraine is Bulgaria, 
because both the structure of its tax system and the level of socio-economic development are most closely 
approximated to Ukraine. Since Switzerland is a latent tax competitor of Ukraine, it is fundamentally 
different in terms of socio-economic development, its further study from the point of view of tax compe-
tition is considered inexpedient. Ukraine belongs to a cluster of countries with a low level of taxation, 
insignificant progressiveness of the system of taxation of incomes of individuals, a significant level of 
social contributions. 
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